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Prisoners’ Fundamental Right to 
Read: Courts Should Ensure that 
Rational Basis is Truly Rational 
Alicia Bianco* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States contains only five percent of the world’s 
population, but is home to twenty-five percent of the world’s 
prisoners.1  The incarceration rate is approximately one in every 
one hundred American adults,2 and all of those incarcerated in 
America are victims of censorship.3  American prisons prevent 
 
 *  Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2015; B.A. in 
International Service, American University, 2011.   
 1.  See Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT 
OF COLORED PEOPLE, http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2015); The Cost of a Nation of Incarceration, CBS NEWS 
(Apr. 23, 2012, 5:15 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3445_162-57418495/ 
the-cost-of-a-nation-of-incarceration/ (“[W]e incarcerate a greater percentage 
of our population than any country on Earth.” (quoting statement of Michael 
Jacobson, Director, Vera Institute of Justice)). 
 2.  Adam Liptak, 1 in 100 U.S. Adults Behind Bars, New Study Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/us/28cnd-
prison.html; Robert E. Rubin & Nicholas Turner, The Steep Cost of America’s 
High Incarceration Rate, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 25, 2014, 4:36 PM), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/robert-rubin-and-nicholas-turner-the-steep-cost-of-
americas-high-incarceration-rate-1419543410.  
 3.  Prisoners challenge prison conditions and regulations as violating 
their constitutional rights.  For example, prisoners often allege violations of 
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prisoners from accessing a variety of publications by refusing to 
order certain publications and, even more chillingly, by preventing 
prisoners from receiving intended publications.4  Publishers rarely 
challenge prison censorship policies, despite having standing to do 
so,5 because, for most publishers, prisoners do not make a 
“sufficiently marketable demographic” to justify challenging the 
prison regulations in court.6  Commentator Andrea Jones 
acknowledges this phenomenon in her discussions on prison 
censorship.7  In one particular instance, she notes that, although 
both publishers and prisoners have standing to challenge 
censorship policies within prisons, in practice publishers “rarely 
act upon notice that the material they’ve mailed has been seized 
or withheld.”8 
Censorship in prisons poses a threat to prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights.9  When censorship violates the First 
Amendment rights of the un-incarcerated, the Supreme Court 
vigorously protects First Amendment rights.10  Yet, courts do not 
protect prisoners’ First Amendment rights to the same degree.  
 
their Eighth Amendment rights.  See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 
(1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296–99 (1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 
U.S. 312, 314 (1986).  However, the subject of this Comment is focused solely 
on the infringement of prisoners’ First Amendment rights by censorship of 
publications.   
 4.  See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 549–50 (1979).  
 5.  See Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“[P]ublishers and inmates have a First Amendment interest in 
communicating with each other.”). 
 6.  Andrea Jones, Battling Censorship Behind Bars: How Prisons and 
Jails Are Barring Inmates’ Access to Legal News, Literature and Letters, 
SALON (May 7, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/05/07/battling_ 
censorship_behind_bars_partner/. 
 7.  See id.  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Jones, supra note 6. 
 10.  See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 
827 (2000) (holding that Playboy’s programming has First Amendment 
protection and stating that a content-based regulation “can stand only if it 
satisfies strict scrutiny”); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 128 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“I would recognize this opportunity to confirm our past holdings 
and to rule that the New York statute amounts to raw censorship based on 
content, censorship forbidden by the text of the First Amendment and well-
settled principles protecting speech and the press.  That ought to end the 
matter.”). 
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The courts, relying on Turner v. Safley,11 have continuously 
deferred to the legislature and prison administrators when 
considering the validity of prison policies that threaten prisoners’ 
First Amendment rights.  In essence, this deference leads to 
courts applying an extremely lenient form of rational basis 
review.12  However, the plain meaning of Turner calls for a 
balancing test.13  This deference is inappropriate in relation to 
prisoners’ reading rights because of the importance of the right at 
issue.14  In addition, the current standard of review is 
inappropriate because prisoners face excessive anti-inmate 
animus and political powerlessness.15  In order to adequately 
protect the rights of prisoners and correctly apply the Turner test, 
the courts should be more discerning and use a form of heightened 
review.  Prisoners should be allotted a heightened version of 
rational basis review in order to protect their constitutional rights. 
This Article examines the censorship that currently exists in 
prisons and the standard of review that courts apply to prisoners’ 
First Amendment challenges to prison censorship policies.  
Further, this Article contends that the deference the courts have 
historically given, and still give, to prison administrators’ policies 
is inappropriate—suggesting that prisoners’ right to read is 
precisely the type of right that should be subject to a stricter 
version of rational basis review, often colloquially called “rational 
basis with a bite.”16 
Part I of this Article examines the current realities prisoners 
 
 11.  482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 12.  See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 522–23 (2006); see also infra 
Part II. 
 13.  See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91; see also infra Part II.  
 14.  See infra Section III.B. 
 15.  See infra Section III.A. 
 16.  The Court has never called “rational basis with a bite” by that name.  
The Court has only referred to the test by its traditional name, rational basis 
review.  When I state that the Court used “rational basis with a bite” review, 
I am referring to the fact that the Court only admitted to using rational basis 
review, but in actuality engaged in a more in-depth analysis.  When the 
Court does not assume that a statute is rationally connected to the 
government interest put forth or sua sponte determines a government 
interest that is related to the challenged statute, but instead searches to see 
if the challenged statute is actually rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest, then, in my opinion, it is applying “rational basis with a 
bite” review.  
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face if they want to simply read a book behind bars.  Part II first 
explores the standard of review that courts apply to prisoners’ 
rights litigation, focusing specifically on the standard of review for 
current First Amendment litigation.  Second, Part II later 
examines the level of deference that is granted to prison 
administrators and how the standard affects the applicable 
standard of review.  In Part III I lay out why a form of heightened 
review, “rational basis with a bite,” is called for when it comes to 
prisoner reading rights.  First, I present an equal protection 
argument, succinctly analyzing a history of prisoners’ rights 
litigation and identifying the political powerlessness of prisoners 
and the animus against them.  I also explain that the courts 
cannot assume that the executive branch, administrative 
agencies, or the legislature are protecting prisoners, as prisoners 
are a vulnerable group.  Second, I present a due process 
argument, arguing that the right to read is a fundamental right.  
Part IV explains the developing “rational basis review with a bite” 
jurisprudence,17 providing a sampling of the cases that have 
applied it and explaining why it was applied.  Finally, Part V 
concludes that courts should, at minimum, use “rational basis 
with a bite” review in order to adequately protect prisoners’ First 
Amendment rights.  In other words, courts should look closely to 
ensure that there is actually a rational relationship between the 
legislation or policy and the asserted legitimate government 
interest.18 
I.  CURRENT POLICIES 
Prisoners throughout the United States are forbidden from 
reading a variety of publications.19  The list of banned 
 
 17.  See Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 460–61 
(Wis. 2005) (“‘Rational basis with teeth,’ sometimes referred to as ‘rational 
basis with bite,’ focuses on the legislative means used to achieve the ends.”). 
 18.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).  
 19.  See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3134.1 (2015).  See also 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404–06 (1989); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 548–49 (1979) (discussing the publisher-only rule, showing that there 
are a variety of restrictions other than censorship that threaten prisoners’ 
First Amendment reading rights); TEX. CIV. RIGHTS PROJECT, BANNED BOOKS 
IN THE TEXAS PRISON SYSTEM 11 (2011) [hereinafter BANNED BOOKS], 
http://www.texascivilrightsproject.org/docs/prisonbooks/TCRP_Prison_Books_
Report.pdf; Matt Berman, The Banned Books and Censored Magazines of 
Connecticut’s State Prisons, ATLANTIC (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.the 
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publications varies from institution to institution,20 and each state 
and federal prison system has a unique banned publication list.21  
However, very few institutions make these lists accessible to the 
public.22  By keeping these lists confidential, institutions are 
preventing free citizens from learning about the restrictions and 
policies.  Thus, the public is not often in possession of the 
necessary information to even understand the abridgement of 
First Amendment rights that prisoners face.  Without this 
information, those among us who sympathize with prisoners are 
without the necessary tools to fight for the rights of the 
incarcerated. 
A. The Regulations 
All federal prisoners are subject to a regulation that states:23 
 
atlantic.com/national/archive/2013/08/the-banned-books-and-censored-
magazines-of-connecticuts-state-prisons/279207/.  It is important to note that 
in many institutions prisoners can only receive paperback newspapers and 
periodicals from publishers; no hardcovers are permitted at all, and friends 
and family cannot send any publications into the institutions.  See 06-070-05 
R.I. CODE R. § III (Lexis Nexis 2015).   
 20.  See, e.g., TDCJ Banned Book List, TEX. C. R. PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://www.texascivilrightsproject.org/2803/banned-books-in-the-texas-
prison-system-how-the-texas-department-of-criminal-justice-censors-books-
sent-to-prisoners/ (follow “Download the banned books list to your computer: 
Excel format” (3.5mb)); see also Andrew Losowsky, Prison Books Ban: The 
Censorship Scandal Inside America’s Jails, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2011, 
8:24 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/02/prison-books-ban_n_ 
991494.html.  
 21.  See, e.g., BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 11.  See also Pat Eaton-
Robb, Connecticut Prison Inmates Reading True Crime and Other Violent 
Books, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 5, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2010/10/04/connecticut-prison-inmate_n_749592.html (noting how at 
least two prisons within the state allow a particular publication concerning a 
group of murders within Kansas in 1959); Warren Richey, Feds’ Request: Let 
Us Take on Jail that Bans All Books Except the Bible, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0413/ 
Feds-request-Let-us-take-on-jail-that-bans-all-books-except-the-Bible.  
 22.  See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 11.  Texas is one of the few 
states that have made their banned book list publically accessible.  See TDCJ 
Banned Book List, supra note 20. 
 23.  As of October 2014, the federal prison population consisted of 
slightly less than 214,000 inmates.  See Population Statistics, FED. BUREAU 
PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2014).  These statistics, which are made publically available 
by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, are updated each Thursday; the data in 
this Comment reflect the numbers available on October 20, 2014.  
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“[T]he Warden may reject a publication only if it is determined 
detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the 
institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity.”24  Conversely, 
“the Warden may not reject a publication solely because its 
content is religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual, or 
because its content is unpopular or repugnant.”25  Moreover, an 
additional federal regulation prevents inmates from obtaining 
publications that have any pectoral images of nudity or sex 
acts26—no law currently exists preventing written accounts of the 
same.  States have adopted similar regulations; however, many of 
those regulations expressly allow for the banning of books due to 
sexually explicit content.27 
Based on the above, prisons may only lawfully ban 
publications in order to further a legitimate penological 
objective.28  “Penological interests are interests that relate to the 
treatment (including punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, etc.) 
of persons convicted of crimes.”29  Two penological objectives 
frequently cited for justifying censorship of publications within 
prisons are rehabilitation and institutional security.30  Penological 
interests sound like firm constructs.  However, which books will 
interfere with rehabilitation and where the border is between 
publications that interfere with institutional security and those 
that may merely depict violence or discuss weaponry but are 
otherwise safe is open to interpretation.  In other words, it is hard 
to discern where the line is drawn between publications that 
interfere with legitimate penological interests and those that are 
protected from infringement.  Additionally, no recent studies exist 
which support the argument that certain publications hinder 
rehabilitation or jeopardize institutional security.  Due to the 
deference afforded to prison administrators, the courts have not 
looked deeper to determine whether pornography actually inhibits 
 
 24.  28 C.F.R. § 540.71 (2014). 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. § 540.72. 
 27.  See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGIS. tit. 15, § 3134.1(e) (2014). 
 28.  See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987). 
 29.  Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 996 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 187 n.10 
(2d Cir. 2001)). 
 30.  See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525–26 (2006). 
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rehabilitation of prisoners in general.31 
Prison wardens often delegate the decision-making power to 
prison employees, whether it is mailroom employees or glorified 
inspectors.32  This delegation of decision-making power gives 
employees the power to make the initial determination of whether 
the publication in question, if not already banned in the 
institution, is either: (a) appropriate for the prison population, or 
(b) inappropriate for the prison population.  Whether the book 
should be rejected or not is often based on the particular 
employee’s subjective understanding of the applicable policy or 
statute.33  This fact is chilling because we are allowing non-elected 
and largely anonymous individuals to routinely make subjective 
decisions that limit a large population’s First Amendment rights.  
It is not easy to determine whether a publication will be 
detrimental to one of the penological interests of the institution 
because it is largely a subjective decision.  For example, some 
schools of thought say reading about gang activities could 
dissuade gang activity; others say that it could foster gang 
activity.34  Publications that some individuals may think threaten 
a penological interest may actually foster a penological interest, 
and vice versa.  Moreover, employees are provided with a cloak of 
 
 31.  See Barry W. Lynn, “Civil Rights” Ordinances and the Attorney 
General’s Commission: New Developments in Pornography Regulation, 21 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 27, 33 (1986).   
 32.  See, e.g., 06-070-05 R.I. CODE R. § III(C) (Lexis Nexis 2015); BANNED 
BOOKS, supra note 19, at 8.   
 33.  See, e.g., BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 8. 
 34.  See Ciempa v. Jones, 745 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1177 (N.D. Okla. 2010), 
aff’d, 511 F. App’x 781 (10th Cir. 2013).  Ciempa involved several publications 
that were withheld from a prisoner in Oklahoma because the publications 
contained gang related material.  See id.  The Oklahoma Department of 
Corrections has a regulation that provides: 
Publications are prohibited that . . .  Advocate terrorism, criminal 
behavior, racial, religious, or national hatred, or any material that 
creates an unsafe environment for the inmates or staff. . . .  The 
facility is not authorized to implement a prohibition on any 
materials that inmates may receive by subscription, such as a 
magazine, newspaper, or other similar type of periodical.  Each issue 
of the material has to be received and reviewed to determine 
whether or not it violates the correspondence restrictions of this 
agency. . . . Correspondence containing gang related material, 
information, photographs, or symbols are prohibited. 
Id. (quoting Okla. Dep’t of Corr., Facility Operations, Correspondence, 
Publications, and Audio/Video Media Guidelines, OP-030117). 
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anonymity to shield their identity from accountability if they 
decide, in an abundance of caution, to ban more publications than 
the applicable policy requires.35 
Today, in Texas, if an incoming book is not already on the 
banned book list, the employees in the mailroom make the 
decision as to whether the prisoner will be allowed to read the 
publication sent to him or her.36  If those employees determine 
that the publication is inappropriate, then the publication is 
added to Texas’s statewide banned book list, and the prisoner 
must jump through administrative hoops to gain access to the 
material.37  In Rhode Island, if the prison’s mailroom officer 
determines that the publication is inappropriate or even 
questionable, the mailroom officer forwards the publication to the 
Central Office Investigator (Investigator) for review.38  The 
Investigator determines if the publication is appropriate and 
whether to give it to the inmate or not.39  Both the prisoner and 
publisher are given notice as to the Investigator’s ultimate 
decision if the book is not allowed.40 
The deference afforded to these prison officials allows the 
animus of society to dictate many of the regulations controlling 
prisoners.  We are trusting mailroom prison employees to protect 
the First Amendment rights of America’s large prison population, 
which is made up of the despised, outcasts of society.41  By giving 
these employees the power to reject or permit publications based 
on their own subjective judgment of whether the publications 
would potentially threaten a legitimate government interest, we 
are unjustly delegating the job of determining the exact extent of 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights.42  The press has called these 
 
 35.  The identity of the mailroom employees in prison institutions are not 
publicized; even the identities of those in the Rhode Island prison system who 
investigate questionable material are not well known.  
 36.  See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 12.  
 37.  See id.  
 38.  See 06-070-05 R.I. CODE R. § III(C) (Lexis Nexis 2015).  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the 
“Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97, 118 & n.207 
(2006).  
 42.  See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3134.1 (2014).  See also Thornburgh v. 
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 406 (1989); BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 12; 
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employees’ decisions arbitrary in the few instances where such 
decisions have been publicized.43  Allowing subjective, arbitrary 
decisions to dictate the extent of prisoners’ First Amendment 
rights is hardly rational. 
The administrative processes that prisoners can utilize in an 
attempt to gain access to “inappropriate” publications varies 
slightly throughout the country.44  In most institutions, prisoners 
can file a grievance45 in an attempt to gain access to the restricted 
material.46  Members of the Department of Corrections, such as 
wardens, directors, or committees, consider these grievances.47  In 
Rhode Island, prisoners can request a review by the Assistant 
Director of the Institution prior to beginning the formal grievance 
process.48  Once a review of the prison employee’s initial findings 
is conducted, many institutions afford prisoners the right to an 
administrative appeal in order to question the institution’s 
decision regarding the publication.49  However, it is important to 
 
Berman, supra note 19. 
 43.   See, e.g., BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 12; Berman, supra note 
19.  However, more often than not, when a prison employee decides to ban a 
publication, notice only goes to the prisoner and perhaps the publisher; the 
public remains in the dark.  See, e.g., 06-070-05 R.I. CODE R. §§ III(A)(2)(i)(2), 
III(A)(2)(j)(1)(b)(2).  
 44.  See Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 
329, 344–49 (2009). 
 45.  For an outline of the basic grievance process and how it works in the 
Rhode Island Prison system, see R.I. DEP’T CORR., INMATE HANDBOOK 30–32 
(2007) [hereinafter R.I. INMATE HANDBOOK], http://www.doc.ri.gov/documents/ 
Inmate%20Handbook%20507.pdf.  
 46.  See Jack Ryan, Handling Grievances in a Jail / Detention Setting, 
LEGAL & LIABILITY RISK MGMT. INST., http://www.llrmi.com/articles/ 
jails/jail_grievances.shtml (last visited Dec. 8, 2015).  One of the most 
important tools for any jail is the grievance process by which inmates may 
file complaints regarding conditions and situations where their rights may 
have been violated.  By providing prisoners with a proper grievance process, 
the jail administration can resolve issues within the jail environment before 
the conditions or events lead to a full-blown lawsuit.  See id.; see also BANNED 
BOOKS, supra note 19, at 8–12; R.I. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 45, at 30–
32.  
 47.  See Shay, supra note 44, at 344–49. 
 48.  See R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., POL’Y AND PROC.: POLICY NO. 24.01-6, 
Attachment C, p. 2 (2010), [hereinafter Inmate Mail], http://www.doc.ri.gov/ 
documents/administration/policy/Inmate%20Mail%20Policy%2013.pdf.   
 49.  See, e.g., 14B N.C. ADMIN. CODE 12B.0103 (2013) (“[T]he inmate 
should be notified in writing within 24 hours of the reason for censorship.  
The inmate shall be afforded the opportunity to appeal the decision in 
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note that during the grievance and/or appeals process, the 
institution returns the publication at issue to the sender.50  
Therefore, the prisoner is at a distinct disadvantage when 
requesting a review, filing a grievance, or appealing an 
institution’s decision because the prisoner lacks access to the 
banned material to formulate his challenge.51  Thus, the review 
processes discussed are often insufficient.  In many systems, once 
the validity of a publication’s ban is denied on appeal, another 
prisoner cannot appeal the same publication’s ban at a later 
date.52  The appeals process is essentially nonexistent if the book 
requested is already a banned book.53 
If a prisoner loses his challenge at the administrative level, he 
may bring his challenge to the courts.54  Only after exhausting his 
or her appeal at the administrative level can a prisoner challenge 
a prison administrator’s decision by filing a claim in court, 
alleging that the decision violated his First Amendment rights.55 
In many prisons throughout the country, prisoners yearn to 
read prohibited publications.56 For example, in 2011, The New 
York Times and other various publishers published a story on 
Mark Melvin, an inmate serving a life sentence at Kilby 
Correctional Facility outside of Montgomery, Alabama.57  Melvin 
was prevented from receiving and reading the Pulitzer Prize 
winning book, Slavery by Another Name, by Douglas A. 
Blackmon.58  The book details a historical investigation on how 
 
writing, within seven days, directly to the Director of the Division of 
Prisons.”).  See also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 406 (1989); BANNED 
BOOKS, supra note 19, at 12.   
 50.  See, e.g., Inmate Mail, supra note 48, at Attachment C, p. 2. 
 51.  See Jones, supra note 6. 
 52.  See id.; see also BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 8–12.  
 53.  See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 8–12. 
 54.  See generally Tracking Prisoner Censorship in the U.S., MAOIST 
INTERNATIONALIST MINISTRY PRISONS, http://www.prisoncensorship.info/data 
(last visited Dec. 8, 2015) (providing a database of prison censorship cases).   
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See generally Clay Calvert & Kara C. Murrhee, Big Censorship in the 
Big House—A Quarter-Century After Turner v. Safley: Muting Movies, Music 
& Books Behind Bars, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 257 (2012).  
 57.  Campbell Robertson, Alabama Inmate Sues to Read Sothern History 
Book, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/ 
us/alabama-inmate-sues-to-read-southern-history-book.html; see Losowsky, 
supra note 20.  
 58.  See Losowsky, supra note 20; see generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, 
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black prisoners were treated in the South during the late 19th and 
early 20th century.59  When the prison officials refused to give 
Melvin his book, Melvin appealed, but the prison officials upheld 
their decision to ban the book.60  As support, the officials “cit[ed] a 
regulation banning any mail that incites ‘violence based on race, 
religion, sex, creed, or nationality, or disobedience toward law 
enforcement officials or correctional staff.’”61  Following the denial 
of his appeal, Melvin brought a lawsuit against the prison 
officials.62  The author of the banned publication commented on 
the absurdity of banning his book, noting that “[t]he idea that a 
book like mine is somehow incendiary or a call to violence is so 
absurd.”63 
After a prisoner exhausts his administrative appeals, a 
prisoner’s only available means of gaining access to the banned 
publication is to file a suit in court, which Melvin did.64  
Information concerning the ultimate outcome of Melvin’s suit has 
not been publicized since 2012, at which time his lawsuit was in 
the discovery phase.65  Numerous cases have been brought by 
prisoners challenging the constitutionality of various restrictions 
on their ability to access certain publications—some of which have 
made their way all the way to the United States Supreme Court, 
as discussed below.66 
In Texas, in 2008, 11,544 of the books sent to state prisoners 
 
SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME (2008). 
 59.  See The Book, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME, http://www.slaveryby 
anothername.com/the-book/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2015) (providing a 
description of Slavery by Another Name).  
 60.  See Losowsky, supra note 20; Robertson, supra note 57.  
 61.  Robertson, supra note 57. 
 62.  See id.  
 63.  See id. (quoting Telephone Interview with Douglas A. Blackmun, 
Author, Slavery by Another Name (2008)). 
 64.  See COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV., A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL ch. 22 
(8th ed. 2009) (establishing that the step after administrative remedies is 
filing suit in federal court).  For more information on Melvin’s lawsuit, see 
Stephanie Siek, Prison Bars White Inmate from Reading ‘Slavery by Another 
Name,’ Citing Security Risk, CNN: IN AMERICA (Feb. 29, 2012, 7:00 AM), 
http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/29/ala-prison-bars-white-inmate-
from-reading-slavery-by-another-name-citing-security-risk/.  
 65.  See Siek, supra note 64.   
 66.  See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 
490 U.S. 401 (1989); Thompson v. Campbell, 81 F. App’x 563 (6th Cir. 2003).  
See also Tracking Prisoner Censorship in the U.S., supra note 54.   
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never reached the inmates because the books were banned by 
either: (a) already being on the banned book list, or (b) being 
deemed inappropriate by a mailroom employee in one of Texas’s 
prisons.67  Prisoners appealed decisions 2472 times in 2008 alone; 
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice heard only 1210 of 
these appeals because approximately 1200 of the books were 
already permanently banned.68  At the end of 2009, Texas prisons 
had banned 11,851 titles.69  The Texas Department of Criminal 
Justice had permanently banned 8002 of the 11,851 titles.70 
B. The Arbitrariness of Prison’s Decisions to Ban Books 
In addition to the shocking number of publications that 
institutions have banned based on the subjective opinion of 
designated prison employees, there are numerous examples of 
publication bans within prisons that make the whole process 
appear even more arbitrary.  For example, in Connecticut,71 state 
prisoners were prohibited from reading the first book in the A 
Song of Ice and Fire series.72  However, at the same time, 
prisoners were permitted to read, A Clash of Kings or A Storm of 
Swords, later books in the same series.73  When considering a 
prisoner’s administrative appeal, the Connecticut Bureau of 
Corrections finally made the first book in the series accessible to 
 
 67.  See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 12–13 (describing the 
discretion given to the employees to determine if, in a case of first impression, 
a publication should be admitted into an institution).  
 68.  See id.  
 69.  See id. at 13 n.16.  
 70.  See id. at 13. 
 71.  In Connecticut:  
Each facility shall establish a review process for all incoming 
publications in accordance with guidelines established by the Media 
Review Board.  The Unit Administrator or designee shall review the 
individual publication prior to the rejection of that publication.  The 
Media Review Board shall then review anything deemed 
objectionable by the facility and notify the Unit Administrator or 
designee of the decision. 
Conn. Dep’t of Corr., Administrative Directive 10.7(4)(N)(2) [hereinafter 
Inmate Communications], available at http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/ 
AD/ad1007.pdf.  
 72.  See Berman, supra note 19. 
 73.  See id.  Some prisoners did in fact read the series out of order 
because of a prior ban on the first book in the series, A Game of Thrones.  See 
id.   
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inmates.74  Other prisons have banned a variety of great literary 
classics.  For example, some of the books that Texas permanently 
banned within its prisons include: Shakespeare & Love Sonnets, 
Utopia, Burmese Days, and Dante Alighieri’s Inferno.75 
The free flow of ideas, especially political ideas, is a key 
element of American democracy.76  A federal prison in Colorado 
actually banned President Obama’s books, Dreams from My 
Father and The Audacity of Hope.77  This ban halted the free flow 
of political ideas, which is directly adverse to the spirit of the First 
Amendment.  The decisions to ban Obama’s books were later 
overturned through the appeals process, demonstrating that the 
initial ban was not related to a legitimate penological interest.78 
While commenting on prison censorship, Andrea Jones 
discussed Prison Legal News (PLN), a national publication of 
which the majority of subscribers are prison-inmates.79  The goal 
of PLN is to increase political awareness and inform prisoners of 
their rights.80  Jones stated that PLN has “faced blanket 
censorship in over ten state prisons systems, and countless bans 
in local jails across the country.”81  This type of “blanket 
censorship” might exemplify that some prisons actually aim to 
keep prisoners uninformed regarding the information that is most 
valuable.  As the free flow of ideas, especially political ideas, is a 
key element of American democracy, it is significant that prisons 
are banning a publication that informs prisoners of their rights.  
Informing prisoners of their rights and transforming them into 
more engaged citizens is a step toward their rehabilitation. Yet, 
prisons frequently justify bans on the basis that access to certain 
publications would be detrimental to rehabilitation.  Banning 
 
 74.  See id.  
 75.  See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 40–41. 
 76.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 108 F. 
Supp. 2d 498, 511 (E.D.N.C. 2000) (“[T]he principle that core political speech, 
essential to the free flow of ideas in a democracy, occupies a highly protected 
place within First Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
 77.  See Sean Hannity, Why Did One Prison Ban Obama’s Books?, FOX 
NEWS (July 14, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/07/14/why-did-one-
prison-ban-obama-books.html. 
 78.  See id. 
 79.  See Jones, supra note 6. 
 80.  See id.  
 81.  Id.  
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informative publications such as PLN can actually threaten the 
same goal that institutions are seeking to accomplish. 
Censorship is occurring in prisons throughout the country and 
threatens prisoners’ First Amendment rights.  Yet, many of the 
decisions to ban publications within prisons appear arbitrary.  
While Mr. Melvin’s story was reported, his story is but a grain of 
sand on a beach full of individuals who are being denied access to 
publications.  The vast majority of these individuals’ stories go 
untold.  Now, we face the question of what happens when 
prisoners, like Mr. Melvin, or the countless others whose 
grievances and/or administrative appeals are denied, bring their 
challenges to court.   
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In 1964, the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Pate implicitly 
recognized that prisoners keep some of their constitutional 
protections.82  The Court also acknowledged in Cooper that 
prisoners could seek protection of their constitutional rights and 
guarantees through the court systems.83  More pointedly, in 1974, 
the Supreme Court expressly expounded in Pell v. Procunier that 
“a prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are 
not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the 
legitimate penological objectives of the correctional system.”84 
Before the Court’s decision in Turner v. Safley, the Court was 
hesitant to discern a clear standard of review for courts to use in 
determining whether a prison regulation or policy violated a 
prisoner’s First Amendment rights.85  In Turner, the Court 
considered the legality of two regulations: the first regulation 
censored correspondences between inmates at different 
 
 82.  See 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964); Stacey A. Miness, Note, Pornography 
Behind Bars, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1702, 1707 (2000); see also Victoria Ford, 
Case Note, First Amendment Rights Behind Bars: To Deny a Prisoner 
Pornography, the Third Circuit in Ramirez v. Pugh Requires Proof of 
Detriment to Rehabilitation, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 74 & n.10 (2006) 
(noting that prisoners retain the same constitutional protections as citizens 
so long as the rights at issue do not conflict with goals of incarceration).   
 83.  Miness, supra note 82, at 1707. 
 84.  417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).  Pell involved members of the press who 
were denied access to interview prison inmates face-to-face.  See id.  The 
Court held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press any 
special access to inmates beyond what is given to the public.  Id.  
 85.  See 482 U.S. 78, 85–89 (1987); Miness, supra note 82, at 1707. 
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institutions, and the second regulation affected prisoners’ ability 
to marry.86  Having yet to pronounce an appropriate standard for 
assessing the constitutionality of prisoners’ rights, the Court used 
Turner to declare the appropriate standard.87  The Court held that 
“when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional 
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.”88  It is clear from both the 
language of Turner and the language of subsequent cases where 
the Turner factors have been applied that the Turner test is 
advocating for rational basis review.89 
The Court ultimately established four factors to help courts 
determine “the reasonableness of the regulation[s] at issue.”90  
The Turner test is in some ways a totality of the circumstances 
test; however, if the first factor is not satisfied, then the regulation 
is not reasonable.91  In determining what factors a court should 
consider in order to decide whether a prison regulation or policy is 
reasonable, the Court reviewed prisoners’ rights jurisprudence.92 
The first factor the Court articulated is that “there must be a 
‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the 
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.”93  The 
regular rational basis test provides that the means of a regulation 
must be rationally related to serving a legitimate governmental 
interest; the language of the traditional rational basis test is quite 
similar to the language the Court used for this factor.94  
 
 86.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 81–82.  Turner held that, while the censorship of 
prisoner-to-prisoner correspondence was reasonably related to legitimate 
security concerns, the regulation restricting access to marriage was not; it 
was considered an exaggerated response to the institution’s security and 
rehabilitative concerns.  Id. at 91.  
 87.  Id. at 78. 
 88.  Id. at 89. 
 89.  See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006). 
 90.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–90. 
 91.  See id.  
 92.  See id. at 78–79.  
 93.  Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).  
Further, the Court stated that it found it “important” to ensure that policies 
that regulated First Amendment rights were neutral and not content based.  
Id. at 90. 
 94.  Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486, 
488–90 (1955) (applying the traditional rational basis test and holding that a 
state regulation of appropriate vendors of optometry equipment was not 
unconstitutional as the regulation was rationally related to a government 
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Essentially, the Court is using this factor to establish the principle 
that in order for a potentially restrictive prison regulation to be 
reasonable, it must pass the rational basis test.95 
The second factor the Court used to determine if a regulation 
was reasonable was “whether there are alternative means of 
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”96  If one 
mode of expression is limited in order to advance a legitimate 
government interest, then the Court wants to assess the other 
options prisoners have to express themselves.97  In Turner, the 
Court expressly advised deference only if there existed alternative 
avenues available for the exercise of the asserted right.98 
Third, the Court inquired into the challenges a prison could 
face if the prison was forced to provide the inmate’s requested 
freedom.99  Again, the Court expressly advised deference only 
“[w]hen accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant 
‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff.”100  Finally, the 
Court advised lower courts to consider the absence of sufficient 
alternatives to censorship.101  The Court stated, “the absence of 
ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison 
regulation.”102  However, existence of a less restrictive alternative 
that accomplished the same desired governmental interest would 
be some evidence that the regulation violated prisoners’ rights.103  
Lower courts continue to use the Turner factors to determine if 
prison regulations violate prisoners’ constitutional rights.104 
 
interest), with Turner, 482 U.S at 89–90 (asserting that prison regulations 
must be rationally and logically connected to a legitimate government 
interest to be considered “reasonable” for the purposes of judicial review). 
 95.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. 
 96.  Id. at 90. 
 97.  See Anna C. Burns, Note, Beard v. Banks: Restricted Reading, 
Rehabilitation, and Prisoners’ First Amendment Rights, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1225, 
1239–40 (2007) (noting the role of deference while also recognizing the need 
to protect prisoners from total deprivation of their rights).  
 98.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.  
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 90–91.  
 102.  Id. at 90. 
 103.  Id. at 90–91. 
 104.  See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131–32, 135–36 (2003); 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989); Thompson v. Campbell, 81 
Fed. App’x. 563, 566–67 (6th Cir. 2003); Willson v. Buss, 370 F. Supp. 2d 782, 
786–87, 790 (N.D. Ind. 2005).   
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A couple years after Turner, the Court decided Thornburgh v. 
Abbot, which focused on the censorship of publications sent to 
prisoners.105  In Thornburgh, the Court harkened that the 
reasonableness standard, applied in Turner, would also apply to 
incoming mail (including, but not limited to, publications that are 
sent to prisons).106  The Court “adopt[ed] the Turner standard . . . 
with confidence that . . . ‘a reasonableness standard is not 
toothless.’”107  Thus, Thornburgh clarified that courts should use 
the Turner test to evaluate whether or not a prison regulation has 
violated a prisoner’s fundamental rights. The Court found the 
Turner test preferable for analyzing these regulations because of 
its “express flexibility.”108 
The Turner factors appear to lay the foundation of a balancing 
test in which the court weighs the prisoner’s rights against the 
institution’s legitimate penological interests.  However, if a court 
really analyzes the four Turner factors, it would be applying 
something more than the traditional rational basis review.109  The 
Court made it clear in Turner that the prison regulations at issue 
did not prompt a heightened standard of scrutiny, which the lower 
courts had previously applied.110  Instead, the Court inquired only 
whether the “prison regulation[s] that [burden] fundamental 
rights [are] ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological 
objectives, or whether [they represent] an ‘exaggerated response’ 
to those concerns.”111  The Court may have rejected an 
intermediate or strict standard of review, but the Court left traces 
of a heightened standard throughout the Turner decision.  While 
the first factor primarily lays out the rational basis test, the other 
three factors look deeper—contemplating other available means of 
exercising the right, considering difficulties that would result if 
the prison was forced to forgo the restriction at issue, and 
inquiring into possible regulatory alternatives that would 
accomplish the asserted interest.112  To some extent, these factors 
 
 105.  490 U.S at 403, 408, 412–14. 
 106.  Id. at 412–14; see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91.  
 107.  Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 414 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at 17 n.10, Thornburgh, 490 U.S. 401 (No. 87-1344)).  
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91. 
 110.  Id. at 83, 86.  
 111.  Id. at 87.  
 112.  Id. at 89–91. 
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inquire into whether the statute is the least restrictive means of 
accomplishing the goal.  Courts only consider least restrictive 
means when applying strict scrutiny.113  Thus, to fully comply 
with Turner, courts should, at minimum, be honestly considering 
how the regulation at issue holds up against each of the four 
factors.  Moreover, just because Turner sets forth a “rational 
basis” review, does not mean that the rational basis standard is 
what should be applied by the courts because the Supreme Court 
does not always get the questions before it correct.114  Prisoners 
need the courts to apply a more meaningful review than 
traditional rational basis review. Therefore, even if the Court was 
setting forth a traditional rational basis test within Turner, which 
I do not believe it was, then courts should reject that test and 
apply a slightly more meaningful review when prisoners’ rights 
are at issue. 
A. The Inescapable Problem of Deference 
Even though Turner and its progenies, including Bell v. 
Wolfish, deal with protecting prisoners’ First Amendment rights, 
the Court frequently promoted deference towards prison 
administrators within these cases.115  When the Court dealt with 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court 
justified giving deference to prison administrators on the ground 
that “the problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a 
corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions.”116  There 
are additional rationales for the Court to give prison 
administrators deference.  First, “courts are ill equipped to deal 
 
 113.  See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
602 (18th ed. 2013). 
 114.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216–18 (1944); 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 393–94 (1857).  
 115.  See 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979); Turner, 482 U.S. at 85–87, 89–91; 
see also Clay Calvert & Justin B. Hayes, To Defer or Not to Defer? Deference 
and Its Differential Impact on First Amendment Rights in the Roberts Court, 
63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 13, 44 (2012) (“[T]he Turner test ‘emphasizes 
deference to prison officials and the relative technical and administrative 
expertise of corrections authorities.’”) (quoting Giovanna Shay, Ad Law 
Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329, 341 (2009)). 
 116.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.  The reasoning behind the Court’s decision to 
provide deference to prison administrators largely mirrors the reasoning 
behind the Court’s choice to endorse a rational basis review in cases of this 
nature.  See supra Section II.A.   
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with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration 
and reform.”117  Second, prison administrators’ responsibilities, 
including “maintaining order, securing the prisons against escape, 
and rehabilitating prisoners, require expertise and complex 
planning.”118  And third, the responsibility of running and 
organizing prisons is markedly “within the province of the 
legislative and executive branches of government,” not the 
judiciary.119  While the aforementioned reasons behind allowing 
prison administrators a degree of regulatory deference may make 
sense, the degree of deference allowed remains far too great. 
The Court instructed the judiciary to “accord[ ] wide-ranging 
deference” to prison administrators when the prison 
administrators maintain that they adopted and executed the 
policies and practices in question because, in their judgment, the 
policies and practices “are needed to preserve internal order and 
discipline and to maintain institutional security.”120  While the 
Court claimed that it sought to balance the constitutional rights of 
inmates with legitimate penological government objectives, the 
level of deference afforded to prison administrators causes the 
purported balancing test in Turner to be heavily slanted against 
prisoners.121  Today, the lower courts’ application of Turner has 
continued to accord prison officials a high level of deference.122 
Recently, the level of deference afforded to prison 
administrators has bordered on the edge of absurdity.  For 
example, in Beard v. Banks, the Court considered a prison 
administrator’s motion for summary judgment on a prisoner’s 
claim that the application of a prison policy violated the prisoner’s 
 
 117.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 
404–05 (1974)). 
 118.  Peter R. Shults, Note, Calling the Supreme Court: Prisoners’ 
Constitutional Right to Telephone Use, 92 B.U. L. REV. 369, 373 (2012). 
 119.  Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–85.  
 120.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 (collecting cases).  
 121.  See Burns, supra note 97, at 1225–28.  
 122.  See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 521, 524–25 (2006); Kaufman 
v. Schneiter, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1023 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (noting the “highly 
deferential” approach courts have taken toward evaluating prison regulations 
when following Turner); Self v. Horel, No. C 07-5347 MMC (PR), 2008 WL 
5048392, at *1, *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008) (applying the Turner test and 
concluding that a prison regulation that banned all material with frontal 
nudity, including an educational book on how to draw, did not violate 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights).  
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First Amendment Rights.123  The Court declared:  “[A]t this stage 
we must draw ‘all justifiable inferences’ in [the prisoner’s] ‘favor.’  
In doing so, however, we must distinguish between evidence of 
disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment.  In 
respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the 
views of prison authorities.”124 
The distinction above twists the summary judgment standard, 
which traditionally draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party rather than distinguishing “disputed matters of 
professional judgment” as a separate consideration.125  If other 
courts give similar breadths of deference to prison administrators 
at this stage of the litigation, it will be very difficult for a 
prisoner’s challenge to survive a summary judgment motion.  The 
level of deference that courts afford to the prison administrators is 
often outcome-determinative; as a result, a motion for summary 
judgment is an extremely effective pre-trial strategy for 
administrators.126  For instance, if a prison administrator asserts 
that a policy, regulation, or particular ban is necessary for 
security, rehabilitation, or another penological interest, then, 
regardless of the truth or extremity of that interest, the courts 
defer to the administrator’s judgment.  Thus, the courts are 
inclined to defer to the prison administrator’s judgment regardless 
of whether a prisoner claims that a policy is in violation of the 
prisoner’s rights, or that the regulated material is appropriate. 
 
 123.  548 U.S. at 524–25.  
 124.  Id. at 529–30 (citations omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). 
 125.  See LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(acknowledging that the summary judgment standard requires a court to 
“review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and to 
draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor”).  In Beard, 
the prisoner was the non-moving party, but he was not given the benefit of all 
reasonable assumptions.  See 548 U.S. at 521.  Instead, the government was 
given the benefit of inferences in its favor because of the level of deference 
afforded to the prison administrators.  See id. at 525, 528, 530.  Summary 
judgment is only appropriate when there is not an issue of material fact.  See 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
56(c)).  Typically, the prisoners’ contentions would create an issue of material 
fact; however, the deference afforded to the administrators overrides the 
prisoner’s argument.  This deprives the prisoner of his right to trial because 
the deference afforded prevents him from getting past the summary 
judgment stage. 
 126.  See Calvert & Hayes, supra note 115, at 53. 
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Beard provides a more specific example of the above 
phenomena.  There, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
deprived all inmates initially, and certain inmates continuously, of 
the right to access photographs and secular magazines or 
newspapers.127  The deputy superintendent of the prison claimed 
that this regulation encouraged inmates to engage in positive 
behavior.128  The Court accepted this contention as rational while 
relying on only the deposition testimony of the deputy 
superintendent.129  The Court stated “that the regulations do, in 
fact, serve the function identified.”130  Thus, the Court held that 
even at the summary judgment stage, there was no dispute as to 
whether the regulation was rationally related to the penological 
goal of rehabilitation—despite the fact that statistics and the 
prisoner refuted the deputy superintendent’s contention.131  
Ordinarily, the prisoner’s contention and the statistics would have 
created a genuine issue of material fact and precluded summary 
judgment, but the deference afforded to the prison administrator’s 
contention ended the case at the summary judgment stage of 
litigation.132 
The current state of jurisprudence makes it quite difficult for 
prisoners to successfully challenge a law or policy as violating 
their constitutional rights because the judiciary affords high 
deference to the prison administrators.133  In Justice Stevens’s 
opinion in Turner, concurring in part and dissenting in part, he 
warned that this would happen, declaring that the majority’s 
standard was “virtually meaningless” and would “permit 
disregard for inmates’ constitutional rights whenever the 
imagination of the warden produces a plausible security concern 
and a deferential trial court is able to discern a logical connection 
 
 127.  Beard, 548 U.S. at 525–27. 
 128.  Id. at 530.  
 129.  Id. at 529–30. 
 130.  Id. at 531. 
 131.  Id. at 530, 534–35.  
 132.  See id. at 525, 532–35. 
 133.  See, e.g., id. at 529–30; Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 
(2003); Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993); Self v. Horel, No. C 
07-5347 MMC (PR), 2008 WL 5048392, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008); 
Kaufman v. Schneiter, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1023 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Snow v. 
Woodford, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).  
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between that concern and the challenged regulation.”134  
Therefore, the level of deference afforded to prison administrators 
has made the rational basis review that courts afford to a 
prisoner’s challenges even weaker than traditional rational basis 
review. 
III.  WHY COURTS SHOULD REVIEW PRISONERS’ CLAIMS THAT 
REGULATIONS ARE VIOLATING THEIR RIGHT TO READ WITH HEIGHTENED 
SCRUTINY 
There is a large variety of information that is withheld from 
prisoners.  When prisoners challenge the regulations and policies 
that endorse censorship, prisoners need the courts to actually 
listen to their claims with an open mind.  It is inappropriate to 
give government policies and regulations such a high level of 
deference.  As discussed below, prisoners are politically weak and 
vulnerable; there is excessive anti-inmate animosity in America; 
they have a history of unequal treatment; and they are currently 
segregated from the rest of society.  From a Due Process 
perspective, the above regulations require heighted scrutiny 
because prisoners’ reading rights are fundamental.  When 
fundamental rights are threatened the court applies strict 
scrutiny.135  It follows that prisoners should be entitled to, at the 
very least, a meaningful form of rational basis review when their 
fundamental rights are threatened. 
 
 134.  482 U.S. 78, 100–01 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  The standard of review applied here ignores facts that 
lead the fact finder to hold that the violation at issue did violate prisoner’s 
rights.  As Stevens’ opinion stated: 
Because the record contradicts the conclusion that the 
administrative burden of screening all inmate-to-inmate mail would 
be unbearable, an outright ban is intolerable.  The blanket 
prohibition enforced at [the institution] is not only an “excessive 
response” to any legitimate security concern; it is inconsistent with a 
consensus of expert opinion—including Kansas correctional 
authorities—that is far more reliable than the speculation to which 
this Court accords deference. 
Id. at 112.  
 135.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) 
(acknowledging the need for a strict scrutiny review of regulations that might 
curtail the civil rights of a single group).  
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A.  Equal Protection 
Courts review challenged laws and policies to determine if 
groups or classes are being unequally treated for an impermissible 
reason.136  A “class” is “a group of people, things, qualities, or 
activities that have common characteristics or attributes.”137  The 
court reviews the challenged regulation more closely if the 
regulation affects certain classes than if it affects others.  For 
instance, a regulation that makes distinctions based on race is 
examined more closely than a regulation that makes distinctions 
based on economic classifications; this is because classes based on 
race are suspect classes.138  Courts consider certain factors in 
order to determine whether a class qualifies as a suspect class, a 
semi-suspect class, or neither:139 history of purposeful unequal 
treatment,140 political powerlessness,141 immutability, origin of 
distinguishing characteristics,142 relevance of characteristic to 
state objectives, and discreteness and coherence of the group.143  If 
a law or policy infringes on a suspect class’s constitutional right, 
the courts uses strict scrutiny to determine if the infringement is 
 
 136.  See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 113, at 601–02. 
 137.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (4th ed. Supp. 2011). 
 138.  See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487, 494 (1954); see 
also SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 113, at 602. 
 139.  See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 429–30 (Conn. 
2008) (“[C]ourts generally have applied the same criteria to determine 
whether a classification is suspect, quasi-suspect or neither.  Just as there is 
no uniformly applied formula for determining whether a group is entitled to 
heightened protection under the constitution, there also is no clear test for 
determining whether a group that deserves such protection is entitled to 
designation as a suspect class or as a quasi-suspect class.” (citations omitted) 
(citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 
(1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976))). 
 140.  See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313. 
 141.  See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 
(1973). 
 142.  See, e.g., Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: 
Towards A Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational 
Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J. L. SOC’Y 18, 59–60 
(2005).  Yet, “[f]aultlessness is . . . not necessary for suspect class status.  For 
example, non-citizens, at least to the extent that they entered the United 
States as adults, can be understood as being accountable for their 
status[.] . . .  Yet, legal aliens are protected under strict scrutiny, even though 
they chose their status.”  Id. at 60; see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 372 (1971).   
 143.  See, e.g., Aukerman, supra note 142, at 51.  
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constitutionally permissible.144  When the courts subject a 
regulation or policy to strict scrutiny the government must show 
that its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling state 
interest.145  If this is proved, the state must then demonstrate 
that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended 
result.146  Courts use intermediate scrutiny if a law or policy 
infringes on the rights of a quasi-suspect class.147  When the 
courts subject a regulation or policy to intermediate scrutiny, the 
government must show that the challenged law advances an 
important government interest by means that are “substantially 
related” to that interest.148  For regulations that do not involve a 
classification, courts apply a “minimal rational review to 
determine whether there the regulation bears a rational 
relationship to a legitimate government interest.”149 
Prisoners have many of the indicia of being a suspect class or 
quasi-suspect class.150  Prisoners have a history of being 
intentionally treated harshly by those in control of their 
environment; prisoners are politically weak if not powerless; and 
prisoners are an insular and discrete class—I discuss each in more 
detail below.151  Courts have held that prisoners are not a suspect 
class or semi-suspect class, and thus, are not entitled to 
intermediate or strict scrutiny if a law or policy affects their 
rights.152  The courts are reluctant to award a heightened review 
 
 144.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); see also 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 
422. 
 145.  See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 414, 422. 
 146.  See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 625–26; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 414. 
 147.  See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993); Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190 (1976).  
 148.  See, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 423 (quoting Ramos v. Vernon, 353 
F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 149.  SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 113, at 602. 
 150.  See Jason E. Pepe, Challenging Congress’s Latest Attempt to Confine 
Prisoners’ Constitutional Rights: Equal Protection and the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 58, 79 (1999).  
 151.  See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Steven, J., 
dissenting) (“Prisoners are truly the outcasts of society.  Disenfranchised, 
scorned and feared . . . [and] shut away from public view, prisoners are surely 
a ‘discrete and insular minority’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Bernal v. 
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 n.7 (1984))); James E. Robertson, The 
Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates As “Outsiders” and the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 204 (2001).  
 152.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Monroe Cty., 311 F.3d 369, 376 n.2 (5th Cir. 
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to prisoners because they are responsible for being members of 
their class.153  However, prisoners share many traits with groups 
that the Courts has classified as suspect or quasi-suspect classes.  
The similarities between prisoners and classes that the Court has 
deemed suspect or quasi-suspect classes demonstrate that 
prisoners are in a weak position within our society. 
1. The Early Rise of Animus Towards Inmates in Judicial 
Review 
Viewing the social, political, and cultural history of prisoners 
in the United States demonstrates that prisoners’ rights warrant 
a stricter judicial review than the current highly deferential, 
rational basis review that is being afforded to prisoners’ 
challenges.154  In America, prisons were initially institutionalized 
in the 1800s.155  The first two American prisons were Cherry Hill, 
which was a solitary confinement institution where the prisoners 
neither saw nor spoke to one another, and Auburn, which was a 
New York state institution where prisoners were forced to walk in 
lockstep, perform hard labor, and remain in constant silence.156  A 
warden at the Auburn institution believed it was actually his duty 
to break the spirit of the prisoners; he “encouraged his guards to 
treat the inmates with contempt and flogged the insane and 
epileptic as well as the recalcitrant.”157  The traditional view was 
that prisoners had no rights because prisoners forfeited their 
 
2002); Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997); Myers v. Lewis, No. 
93-16373, 1994 WL 83278, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 1994); White v. Wexford 
Health Sources, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-00161-GHD-JMV, 2012 WL 3000645, at *4 
(N.D. Miss. July 23, 2012); Hernandez v. Dretke, No. Civ.A. 104CV186C, 
2005 WL 170722, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2005). 
 153.  See Walker Newell, An Irrational Oversight: Applying the PLRA’s 
Fee Restrictions to Collateral Prisoner Litigation, 15 CUNY L. REV. 53, 71 
(2011). 
 154.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472–73 
n.24 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 155.  See Miness, supra note 82, at 1704 (citing Alvin J. Bronstein, 
Offender Rights Litigation: Historical and Future Developments, in 2 
PRISONERS’ RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 5, 5 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1980)). 
 156.  See Kathleen Engel & Stanley Rothman, The Paradox of Prison 
Reform: Rehabilitation, Prisoners’ Rights, and Violence, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 413, 418–19 (1984).  
 157.  Id. at 419 (quoting JOHN BARTLOW MARTIN, BREAK DOWN THE 
WALLS 115 (1954)). 
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rights as a punishment for committing and being convicted of a 
crime.158  Nineteenth-century courts openly supported this notion 
because courts are a product of their contemporary society, in that 
judges are citizens too.159  In a published decision during this 
time, one court stated that a convict, while imprisoned, “has, as a 
consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his 
personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords 
to him.  He is for the time being the slave of the State.”160  At this 
time, the courts followed the view that the legislature, executive, 
and prison officials were responsible for drafting and 
implementing the laws that would dictate the condition in which 
inmates would live; the courts followed this view to such an extent 
that they kept their hands off prisoners’ rights.161 
Eventually, courts accepted that prisoners had rights, but 
they followed what is called the “hands-off” doctrine towards 
prisoners.162  Just as the name implies, the “hands-off” doctrine 
meant that the judiciary did not interfere with internal operations 
of prisons; under the “hands-off” doctrine the courts were without 
power to supervise prison administration or interfere with 
ordinary prison rules and regulations.163  Essentially, the “hands-
off” doctrine prevented the judiciary from protecting prisoners’ 
rights.164  This doctrine existed because the courts “assumed they 
had no power to supervise prison administration or interfere with 
prison rules or regulations, even in the face of a possible 
constitutional violation.”165  Inmates imprisoned during the epoch 
 
 158.  See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871); 
Miness, supra note 82, at 1704. 
 159.  See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 425 (1857) (holding 
that a slave brought to a free state would remain a slave because, as an 
African American, he was not a citizen, and, thus, he did not have standing to 
sue); Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 796 (holding that the Court had thus 
endorsed slavery and a version of concentration camps at a time when society 
had deemed those things acceptable because, unfortunately, the animus of 
society occasionally invades the courts); see also Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding it constitutional to intern Japanese 
Americans during World War II).   
 160.  Ruffin, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 796. 
 161.  See id.; see also Miness, supra note 82, at 1704–05. 
 162.  See Miness, supra note 82, at 1705.  
 163.  See, e.g., Davis v. Finney, 902 P.2d 498, 501 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995). 
 164.  See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 130 (D. Colo. 1979); 
Clements v. Turner, 364 F. Supp. 270, 276 (D. Utah 1973). 
 165.  Cheryl Dunn Giles, Note, Turner v. Safley and Its Progeny: A 
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of the “hands-off doctrine experienced a host of inhumane acts, 
including racial segregation[,] poor medical care[,] inmate-on-
inmate assault[,] staff brutality and indifference[,] and 
squalor.”166  Coinciding with the civil rights movement of the 
1960s, as well as numerous prison riots around the country 
protesting the terrible conditions inside prisons, courts began to 
reject the hands-off doctrine.167  Although courts were willing to 
hear prisoners’ challenges that regulations and policies violated 
their constitutional rights, as one scholar documented, “remnants 
of the ‘hands-off’ doctrine [remained throughout] the area of 
prisoner [rights] litigation.”168 
While the “hands-off” doctrine has eroded, courts remain 
reluctant to involve themselves in the problems that arise in 
prison administration.169  The deference afforded to prison 
administrators today is a remnant of the “hands-off” doctrine.170  
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that 
this deference is owed to the prison administers,171 and thus, has 
led other courts to follow its precedent and furnish prison 
administrators with deference as well.172  Prison administrators 
and the legislature are primarily entrusted with the task of 
running prisons and setting policies.173  The judiciary has not 
sought to step in and take an active role in the running of 
prisons.174  Yet, in actuality, the shocking, dangerous, and 
 
Gradual Retreat to the “Hands-Off” Doctrine?, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 220 
(1993). 
 166.  Robertson, supra note 41, at 100 (footnotes omitted). 
 167.  See Giles, supra note 165, at 222 (citing Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 
546 (1964) (“[T]he Court [has] recognized that inmates retain certain 
constitutional rights and privileges and may seek redress in court for their 
unlawful deprivation.”); Miness, supra note 82, at 1705–06 (citing BRANHAM 
& KRANTZ, SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 
129–30 (4th ed. 1994)). 
 168.  Miness, supra note 82, at 1707 (citing BRANHAM & KRANTZ, 
SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 132 (4th ed. 
1994)).  
 169.  See, e.g., Clements v. Turner, 364 F. Supp. 270, 277 (D. Utah 1973). 
 170.  See id.  
 171.  See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1989); Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987). 
 172.  See, e.g., Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 509–10 (11th Cir. 1996); 
Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 173.  See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 354 (1981). 
 174.  See id.  
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merciless conditions in prisons that frequently violate the 
prisoners’ rights have been forced upon judicial notice by prison 
riots brought about by inmates fighting for their rights and the 
occasional public interest story, discussing the conditions 
prisoners live under.175  By allowing too much deference—a 
remnant of the “hands-off” doctrine—to affect decisions on 
inmates’ constitutional challenges, the courts are enabling any 
anti-inmate animus to form the basis of regulations that threaten 
prisoner rights. 
2. Animus Towards and Political Weakness of Prisoners 
In a strong dissenting opinion in Hudson v. Palmer, Justice 
Stevens expressed that “[p]risoners are truly the outcasts of 
society.  Disenfranchised, scorned and feared[,] . . . [they are] shut 
away from public view, prisoners are surely a ‘discrete and insular 
minority.’”176  The institutionalization of prisons brought with it 
the “practice of ‘civil death,’” which consisted of penalizing 
convicted offenders with a set of criminal penalties that included, 
among other things, the revocation of voting rights.177  This 
practice of a “civil death” still exists today for the vast majority of 
prisoners.  Currently, only two states allow imprisoned felons to 
vote.178  All of the other states prevent felons who are currently 
serving a sentence from voting.179  As of 2014, 5.85 million 
Americans were prohibited from voting because they had been 
convicted of a felony.180  Some states restrict voting rights of a 
 
 175.  See id. at 354 (citing Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 
F. Supp. 676, 684 (Mass. 1973)). 
 176.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting  Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 n.7 (1984)) (advocating a more 
thorough judicial review of prisoners claims, asserting that the presumption 
that all conduct by prison guards is reasonable is unsupported).  
 177.  See JEAN CHUNG, SENT’G PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A 
PRIMER 2 (2013), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_Felony 
%20Disenfranchisement%20Primer.pdf. 
 178.  See id. at 1 (noting that Maine and Vermont do not restrict prisoners’ 
voting rights even if they have a felony conviction).  
 179.  See id. at 1 tbl. 1 (providing a chart dictating how long felons are 
prevented from voting in each state).  
 180.  Id. at. 1 & tbl. 1 (noting that the 5.85 million disenfranchised felons 
include both those currently incarcerated for committing felonies and citizens 
that had been convicted of felonies and released but had permanently lost 
their right to vote). 
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convicted felon even after he or she has served his or her sentence 
and is no longer on probation or parole.181  Thus, many 
imprisoned felons, and many free people who have experienced 
prison life, are currently disenfranchised.  This disfranchisement 
greatly weakens the political power and voice of prisoners.182  
Prisoners get little to no protection from the political processes; 
they lack an organized or even a largely enfranchised 
constituency.183  Prisoners must rely on federal courts for 
protection of their constitutional rights, as the judiciary is the only 
branch of the federal government that is not elected.184 
In America, prisoners are one of the only groups that are still 
acceptable, perhaps even politically correct, to hate.185  
Politicians, who are often responsible for making and 
implementing the conditions in prisons, compete to be the 
toughest on crime.  Moreover, politicians repeatedly advocate laws 
that restrict prisoners’ rights.186  Prisoners face—and have 
historically faced—extreme negative animus in the community as 
well.187  For example, citizens frequently fight against allowing 
halfway houses or rehabilitation facilities in their 
neighborhoods.188  Citizens claim that they do not want a criminal 
element near communities comprised of free citizens, even though 
these institutions can greatly help prisoners.189  Clearly, the 
mindset that prisoners “deserve what they get” by virtue of 
committing the crime they were convicted of is not gone from 
modern society. 
When a group is politically insular and/or powerless, courts 
should look closely at whether the government interest that the 
 
 181.  See id. at 1 tbl. 1. 
 182.  See id. at 5. 
 183.  See Robertson, supra note 151, at 203–04. 
 184.  See id. 
 185.  See Aukerman, supra note 142, at 18–19.  
 186.  See id.  
 187.  See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also CHRISTOPHER SMITH, 
COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 288 (1993) (“Incarcerated 
criminal offenders constitute a despised minority without political power to 
influence the policies of legislative and executive officials.”); Robertson, supra 
note 151, at 203. 
 188.  See, e.g., Cmty. Res. for Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 949 A.2d 
681, 684 (N.H. 2008). 
 189.  See id. 
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policymakers use to justify the regulation is in fact rationally 
related to the regulation.  Heightened rational basis review is 
particularly important because an insular group is not in the 
majority and may not be integrated into society.  This factor has 
helped lead courts to categorize a particular group as suspect and 
apply strict scrutiny.190  Prisoners are particularly insular as they 
are physically separated from the rest of society by the bars on 
their cells.  Thus, they deserve a close review into whether the 
government interests are, in fact, reasonable. 
Prisoners have many characteristics consistent with suspect 
classes and quasi-suspect classes.  Yet, courts do not acknowledge 
prisoners as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  I do not argue that 
prisoners’ challenges should be given intermediate or strict 
scrutiny, as the Court has refused to grant prisoners this level of 
review.  The fact that the Court does not consider prisoners to be a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class does not negate all of the 
characteristics that prisoners share with suspect and quasi-
suspect classes.  The fact that prisoners share so many 
characteristics with these vulnerable classes points to the need to 
afford prisoners the most stringent strand of rational basis review 
available to courts. 
B.  Fundamental Rights 
1.  Prisoners Retain Rights 
As the Court stated in Turner, “Prison walls do not form a 
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the 
Constitution.”191  Further, the Court has also stated that “a prison 
inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not 
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 
penological objectives of the correctional system.”192  Prisoners 
retain the basic civil right to read and stay informed with national 
events.  Prisons throughout the country recognize this right.193  
The Federal Bureau of Prisons expressly recognizes the right to 
read and stay informed by ensuring via regulation that each 
 
 190.  See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533–35.  But see San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 191.  482 U.S. 78, 84 (1986). 
 192.  Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 
 193.  See Burns, supra note 97, at 1266 n.254. 
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prison provides a library service stocked with a wide variety of 
reading materials to which inmates regularly have access.194 
2.  The Right to Read is A Fundamental Right 
The free segments of the population possess a right to read.195  
The United States Constitution states “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”196  
Nevertheless, it is understood that the First Amendment grants 
rights that are not specifically enumerated in the words of the 
First Amendment.197  “[T]he Supreme Court has ruled that 
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
containing implied rights.”198  While the rights implied from the 
penumbra of the Bill of Rights are not expressly in the 
Constitution, or within the First Amendment, they are necessary 
to give full meaning, life, and substance to the express guarantees 
of the Amendments.199  One of these implied rights is the right to 
read.200 
 
 194.  See 28 C.F.R. § 544.100 (2014).  
 195.  See Stanley Wu, Note, Persona Non Grata in the Courts: The 
Disappearance of Prisoners’ First Amendment Constitutional Rights in Beard 
v. Banks, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 981, 981, 989 (2007).  
 196.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 197.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. 
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–67 (1982); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 
(1965); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). 
 198.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (4th ed. Supp. 2011) (defining a 
“penumbra” as “[a] surrounding area or periphery of uncertain extent”).  The 
clauses of the First Amendment are among the specific guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights that have a penumbra.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–84. 
 199.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–84. 
 200.  See id. at 482 (citing Martin, 319 U.S. at 143).  Freedom of speech 
and the penumbra of rights it encompasses are among the fundamental 
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement or 
constitutional abridgment by the states.  See id. at 488, 499 (Goldberg, J., 
concurring); see also Schneider v. New State, 308 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1939) 
(“This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as 
fundamental personal rights and liberties.  The phrase is not an empty one 
and was not lightly used.  It reflects the belief of the framers of the 
Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free 
government by free men.”) (footnote omitted); Smith v. Wash. State Dep’t of 
Corr., No. C13-5138 RBL-JRC, 2014 WL 813703, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3, 
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First 
Amendment includes the right to read.201  In Martin v. City of 
Struthers, the Court stated: 
The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and 
unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but 
they chose to encourage a freedom [,] which they believed 
essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph 
over slothful ignorance.  This freedom embraces the right 
to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right 
to receive it.202 
In addition, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court acknowledged 
that: 
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the 
First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available 
knowledge.  The right of freedom of speech and press 
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the 
right to distribute, the right to receive, [and] the right to 
read.203 
What would be the point of being able to talk or write freely if no 
one could hear what you said or read what you wrote?204  In my 
opinion, such a restriction would turn our fundamental First 
Amendment freedoms into empty rights. 
More directly to the issue, in Stanley v. Georgia, the Court 
held that a state could not criminalize the private possession of 
obscene material by a consenting adult because every person has a 
vested interest in being able to read and receive information and 
ideas freely.205  The Court stated that “[i]f the First Amendment 
 
2014) (“Prison inmates have a First Amendment right to send and receive 
mail.  This right applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 201.  See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482; Martin, 319 U.S. at 143. 
 202.  319 U.S. at 143 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 203.  381 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added) (citing Martin, 319 U.S. at 143). 
 204.  See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (“It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only 
sellers and no buyers.”).   
 205.  394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).  Later cases have held that the mere 
possession of child pornography is an exception to this rule because “the 
interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests 
justifying the Georgia Law at issue in Stanley.”  Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 
103, 108 (1990).   
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means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a 
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or 
what films he may watch.”206  The reasoning of Stanley is 
trumpeted in Justice Marshall’s dissent to a prisoners’ rights case 
where he explained, the fact “[t]hat individuals have a 
fundamental First Amendment right to receive information and 
ideas is beyond dispute.”207  The Court has long recognized that 
the right to read and receive information and ideas, regardless of 
their social worth, is fundamental to the free American society:208 
“Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he 
desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free 
society that . . . it must be fully preserved.”209 
Typically, the courts review any regulation or policy that 
threatens a fundamental right with strict scrutiny.210  As Justice 
Brennan said in his concurrence in Lamont v. Postmaster General 
of the United States: “In the area of First Amendment freedoms, 
government has the duty to confine itself to the least intrusive 
regulations which are adequate for the purpose.”211  When a 
prisoner claims his fundamental rights have been violated, the 
courts subject the claim to the Turner test, and refuse to review 
the claim with heighted scrutiny.212  However, similar restrictions 
on a free citizen’s fundamental right to read would trigger 
heightened scrutiny.213  While the Court acknowledges, to some 
 
 206.  Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. 
 207.  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 572–73 (1979) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 208.  See, e.g., Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486–87 
(Goldberg, J., concurring).  
 209.  Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1943). 
 210.  See, e.g., Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000 
(7th Cir. 2006) (“Heightened scrutiny . . . is appropriate when government 
action interferes with a person’s fundamental rights, such as freedom of 
speech or religion.”); Ulrika Ekman Ault, Note, The FBI’s Library Awareness 
Program: Is Big Brother Reading Over Your Shoulder?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1532, 1539 (1990). 
 211.  381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 212.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87–91 (1987); see also Sharon 
Dolovich, Forms of Deference in Prison Law, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 245, 254 
(2012) (“In the prisoners’ rights context, there is an obvious tension between 
the Turner test, which if not identical to rational basis review is certainly a 
species of it, and the fact that in many cases, it is prisoners’ fundamental 
rights—ordinarily afforded heightened scrutiny—that are at issue.”). 
 213.  See Pepe, supra note 150, at 72 (“With respect to burdens of 
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extent, that the Government has the duty to confine itself to the 
least intrusive regulations when First Amendment rights are 
threatened within prison walls, the Court still applies rational 
basis review to determine the constitutionality of the statutes, 
regulations, or prison policies.214  As one scholar has argued, the 
first factor of the Turner test, rationality, actually acts as a 
“leveler of rights by drawing no distinction between [prisoners’] 
‘weak’ (non-fundamental) and ‘strong’ (fundamental) rights.”215 
Reading habits correlate with being an active participant in 
one’s community and foster the free flow of ideas.216  These 
benefits are key to democratic functioning and can aid in the 
penological objective of rehabilitation by keeping a prisoner’s mind 
engaged.217  One Federal Communications Commissioner 
expressed the importance of the free flow of ideas to the core of our 
democracy: “We have to secure our legacy as Americans—the free 
flow of ideas and information that was at the very foundation of 
our country.”218  Prison officials cite the penological goal of 
rehabilitation to justify prison censorship.219  However, reading 
helps engage prisoners’ minds and fosters a free flow of ideas.220  
Furthermore, reading promotes active engagement in the 
community.221  Thus, reading can actually serve rehabilitative 
ends.222 
 
prisoners’ fundamental rights, the Court has crafted an intermediate 
standard of review.”); Eric Rieder, Note, The Right of Self-Representation in 
the Capital Case, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 130, 135–36 (1985) (addressing, in part, 
that the right to self-representation is a fundamental right).  Yet, under this 
supposed intermediate standard, “[g]overnment action that burdens 
prisoners’ fundamental rights fails . . . unless it is reasonably related to a 
legitimate penological interest.”  Pepe, supra note 150, at 72.  This standard 
is eerily similar to rational basis review, especially considering the level of 
deference given to the government.  See Dolovich, supra note 212, at 254. 
 214.  See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 531–32 (2006); Turner, 482 
U.S. at 87. 
 215.  Robertson, supra note 41, at 120. 
 216.  See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
 217.  See id. 
 218.  Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks 
at the National Conference for Media Reform, Minneapolis, Minnesota 3 
(June 8, 2008). 
 219.  See Burns, supra note 97, at 1256–58 & n.206. 
 220.  See BANNED BOOKS, supra note 19, at 5–6. 
 221.  See id. at 5. 
 222.  See Clark v. California, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1179 & n.2 (N.D. Cal. 
2010).  
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Since the right to read is a fundamental right, the courts 
should strictly comply with the Turner test to ensure that 
prisoners’ fundamental rights are not being arbitrarily violated.  
The Turner test stands for rational basis review, but there is 
nothing preventing the courts from looking deeper into the Turner 
factors to ensure that the regulations and decisions are actually 
reasonable.  The courts ought to analyze each factor much more 
closely; it is absurd that they do not, as an enhanced rational basis 
review is what the test calls for on its face. 
IV. RATIONAL BASIS WITH A BITE 
The current application of the Turner test does not work.  
Prisoners’ challenges are not adequately reviewed.  Prisoners need 
extra protection because reading rights are fundamental rights, 
and prisoners are a class with many characteristics that define 
suspect and/or quasi-suspect classes.  The Court refuses to review 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights challenges with intermediate 
or strict scrutiny.  Accordingly, I suggest that an enhanced 
rational basis review be applied to prisoners’ First Amendment 
rights challenges. 
Three levels of scrutiny purportedly exist, including rational 
basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.223  In 
some cases, the Court seems to add teeth to its rational basis 
review, causing it to become a meaningful hurdle to overcome.224  
The Court has applied this heightened rational basis review, 
“rational basis with a bite,” when considering laws that 
disadvantage certain classes of people.225  While the Court has 
 
 223.  See Calvert & Hayes, supra note 115, at 13, 21–22; Susannah W. 
Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 743 
(2014) (arguing that the level of scrutiny courts apply can often be outcome 
determinative).  Under rational basis review, the courts will uphold the law 
at issue only if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.  
See Pollvogt, supra note 223, at 743.  When using intermediate scrutiny, the 
courts will uphold the law at issue only if it is substantially related to an 
important government interest.  See id. at 744.  When the court is using strict 
scrutiny, it will uphold the law at issue only if it was enacted for a compelling 
government interest, is narrowly tailored, and the least restrictive means to 
achieve the compelling interest.  See id. 
 224.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 533–34 (1973). 
 225.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442–
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never expressly acknowledged such a standard of review, “rational 
basis with a bite” occurs when the Court, purportedly using 
traditional rational basis review, searches for an actual, rational 
connection between a regulation, statute, or policy and a 
legitimate governmental interest.226  Despite the fact that 
“rational basis with a bite” exists, prisoners’ fundamental rights 
claims are currently subjected to one of the least effectual and 
most deferential forms of rational basis review.227 
A.  Traditional Rational Basis Review 
Courts are more deferential to the government’s purported 
objectives under rational basis review than under strict scrutiny 
review.228  The traditional rational basis review utilized today is 
very similar to the standard set forth by the Court in 1911.229  
Under rational basis review, the court will uphold the law at issue 
only if it is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose.230  “When [a] classification . . . is called in question, if 
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain 
it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was 
enacted must be assumed.”231  Clearly, the conventional wisdom 
is, when using this form of rational basis review, virtually any 
regulation will be deemed rational.232 
 
47 (1985) (the class of people with intellectual disabilities); Moreno, 413 U.S. 
at 533–35 (the “hippie” class).  Rational basis with a bite review is 
unnecessary when a law threatens a class that the Court has expressly 
recognized as either a quasi-suspect or suspect class, because those classes 
are entitled to intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny, respectively.  See 
Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny 
By Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 793 (1987) (arguing that rational basis 
with a bite review is merely the Court’s use of the intermediate scrutiny 
standard, despite declining to recognize a class as quasi-suspect). 
 226.  See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35; 
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533–34. 
 227.  See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 531–32 (2006); Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987); see also Calvert & Hayes, supra note 115, at 44.  
 228.  See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 113, at 602. 
 229.  See Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).   
 230.  See Pollvogt, supra note 223, at 743. 
 231.  Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78.   
 232.  See Aukerman, supra note 142, at 3; Daniel Farber & Suzanna 
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 262 (1996) (“[W]e all 
teach our students, the Court never invalidates statutes unless it applies 
something more than ‘real’ minimal scrutiny.”) (footnote omitted).  
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Historically, the Court has stated, “[f]or protection against 
abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to 
the courts.”233  Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. is an early case 
where the court used rational basis review.234  In this case, the 
Court had no proof before it that the regulation at issue served a 
legitimate government purpose; however, the Court presented 
hypothetical facts that connected the regulation to a legitimate 
government purpose.235  It is easy to see that traditional rational 
basis review has been construed to be a very weak level of 
review.236 
B.  Rational Basis with a Bite Review Jurisprudence 
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the 
Court applied “rational basis with a bite” review to invalidate a 
law that disadvantaged hippies.237  Despite the fact that the 
government attempted to justify the disputed regulation by 
claiming an interest in: (1) “rais[ing] levels of nutrition among 
low-income households” and (2) “strengthen[ing] our agricultural 
economy,” the Court found the law irrelevant to these purposes.238  
Thus, the Court found the law could not withstand judicial review, 
stating that the law as applied was “wholly without any rational 
 
 233.  Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) 
(quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).  
 234.  See id. at 487–91.  The Court upheld a regulation that favored one 
group (opticians) over another group (the sellers of ready to wear doctors).  
See id.  While the facts are not significant to this paper, the review the Court 
gave in that case exemplifies traditional rational basis review.  
 235.  See id. at 487, 490–91. 
 236.  Compare Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 522, 530–32 (2006) (stating 
that the courts must show “substantial deference to the professional 
judgment of prison administrators” and accepting the administrators’ 
assertion that deprivation of access to newspapers, magazines, and 
photographs was reasonably connected to the legitimate penological interest 
of incentivizing better behavior), with Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487 (noting 
that the regulation at issue “may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in  
many cases,”  but then devising hypotheticals to connect the regulation to a 
legitimate governmental interest  and determining  it  “is for the legislature, 
not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new 
requirement”).  
 237.  413 U.S. 528, 529, 534, 543 (1973).  The law at issue technically 
disadvantaged groups of unrelated people who lived together by preventing 
them from receiving food stamps.  See id. at 529.  However, the law did so in 
a way that disadvantaged hippies.  See id. at 534, 537. 
 238.  Id. at 533–34. 
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basis.”239  The court went on to note that the real reason for the 
law, which was evident from the legislative history, was to 
prevent hippies from receiving food stamps.240  That purpose did 
not justify the restriction because laws or regulations based on 
negative animus without some independent, legitimate interests 
are invalid.241  Therefore, the Court proclaimed that “if the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means 
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”242  This is significant because, 
inferring from Douglas’s concurrence, one could interpret the 
Court’s holding to be the result of looking beyond the 
government’s surface justification for the law and engaged in more 
in-depth analysis than is typical for rational basis review.243 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the law at issue made it a crime to 
commit sodomy and, thus, prohibited male homosexual 
intercourse.244  Based on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence it is clear 
that she looked closely at how rarely the law was being 
enforced.245  Based on this review of the law, she discerned that 
the law “serve[d] more as a statement of dislike and disapproval 
against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior,” and 
thus, she and the majority of the Court ruled the law was 
invalid.246  In reaching this conclusion, the Court overturned 
precedent and held that moral disapproval alone cannot be a 
legitimate government interest that allows for a constitutional 
infringement.247  In Romer v. Evans, the Court used rational basis 
review but looked critically at the purported government 
objectives to see if those objectives were actually being served by 
 
 239.  Id. at 538.  
 240.  Id. at 534, 537–38. 
 241.  Id. at 534.   
 242.  Id.  
 243.  Id. at 543–44. 
 244.  539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).  
 245.  See id. at 583. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 246.  Id. at 583.  
 247.  Id. at 577–78 (majority opinion); see id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate 
governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal 
classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the 
group burdened by the law.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 
(1996)).  
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the amendment at issue.248  In considering an amendment to 
Colorado’s State Constitution, which prevented protected status 
based upon homosexuality or bisexuality, the Court ultimately 
held that the amendment at issue violated the rights of 
homosexual citizens because the under-and-over-inclusive nature 
of the amendment revealed that the amendment was based on 
negative animosity towards homosexuals.249 
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc., the Court 
again purported to use ordinary rational basis review to determine 
whether a challenged regulation required a special use permit to 
operate a home for the mentally disabled.250  However, the Court 
questioned whether the government’s contention “that other 
people can live under such ‘crowded’ conditions when mentally 
retarded persons cannot” was legitimate.251  Traditionally, 
however, under rational basis review, the government does not 
need to prove that its contentions were true to uphold a 
questionable statute because as long as the government’s views 
are possible, the court would assume that the version of the facts 
that would support the government’s regulation existed.252  Yet, 
while using what I and many others call “rational basis with a 
bite,” the Court closely looked at the threatened class’s social, 
cultural, and political history.253  Moreover, the Court reviewed 
the class’s current status in society to determine if the regulation 
was reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose, or 
alternatively, based on negative animus for the group.254  Once 
the Court determined that the mentally disabled were not an 
 
 248.  517 U.S. 620, 626, 631–33, 635 (1996). 
 249.  Id. at 621, 632–34; see also SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 113, at 
751.  
 250.  473 U.S. 432, 432 (1985).  Though the ordinance at issue was not 
invalid on its face, the Court ultimately held that the regulation was valid; 
the regulation was invalidly applied in this case because the denial of the 
special use permit was not rationally related to the government interests that 
the city presented.  See id.  
 251.  Id. at. 450 (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, 726 
F.2d 191, 202 (1984)). 
 252.  See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 522, 531–32 (2006) (accepting 
the prison officials’ contentions without any supporting proof that the 
regulation actually served the purpose); Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
 253.  Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432, 438, 446–48, 450, 453–55. 
 254.  Id. at 442–47. 
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appropriate class for heightened scrutiny, the Court still looked 
critically at each justification the government put forth to see if 
the denial of the special use permit was rational.255  Ultimately, 
the Court determined that the denial was not rational.256 
The cases above demonstrate that under a certain line of case 
law, courts, purportedly acting under rational basis review, gave 
regulations at issue an enhanced review.  The courts reviewed 
beyond the government’s bare assertion of why the regulation at 
issue was appropriate; the courts did this rather than accepting 
the lawmakers’ justification at face value.  The Court did not 
accept the lawmakers’ justifications at face value under “rational 
basis with a bite,” simply because a set of facts can be reasonably 
conceived to sustain the law or policy at issue; the existence of 
those facts, at the time the law was enacted, are not presumed.257  
Under rational basis review a court would accept any conceivable 
justification for a law or statute, but under “rational basis with a 
bite” as demonstrated above the courts actually look into the 
credibility of the justification. 
C.  Prisoners Reading Rights Are Entitled to “Rational Basis with 
a Bite” 
Prisoners’ reading rights are exactly the type of rights that 
deserve heightened scrutiny.  The courts need to apply a heighted 
form of rational basis review when considering the 
constitutionality of restrictions that infringe upon prisoners’ 
fundamental reading rights.  Further, regardless of the right at 
issue, prisoners as a group have many characteristics that are 
indicative of a suspect or a quasi-suspect class.258  Therefore, the 
courts should look closely at restrictions that disadvantage 
prisoners.  Also, Turner itself lays out something more than the 
pure rational basis test, as the Turner test sets forth that when 
reviewing prisoners’ claims, courts should look at the rational 
basis test and three other factors in order to determine if a 
 
 255.  Id. at 446, 448–50. 
 256.  Id. at 448, 450. 
 257.  See Beard, 548 U.S. at 522–23 (2006); see also U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973).   
 258.  See Aukerman, supra note 142, at 51–56 (comparing characteristics 
of former prisoners and groups classified as suspect). 
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challenged regulation or policy is reasonable.259 
The standard derived from Turner calls for courts to consider 
whether “prison regulation[s] that [burden] fundamental rights 
[are] ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological objectives, or 
whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to those 
concerns.”260  The current application of the Turner test is every 
bit as toothless as Justice Stevens warned that it would be in his 
dissent, due at least in part to the extraordinary deference 
afforded to prison administrators.261  Though this standard seems 
to call for a slightly heightened form of review, in practice, the 
Turner test is clearly used as a weak strand of rational basis 
review.262 
Prisoners are disenfranchised, politically weak, and 
unpopular.  The policies infringing upon the fundamental reading 
rights of prisoners are overinclusive as they prevent individuals, 
without any individualized assessment, from receiving 
publications.  It is my opinion that the publications in most, if not 
all, prisoners’ hands would not compromise institutional security 
or rehabilitative goals.  However, because people must be 
convicted of a crime in order to become initiated into the class, 
courts have been unwilling to apply heightened scrutiny.263  
Prisoners have many of the qualities that traditionally encouraged 
courts to review other classes’ constitutional challenges using the 
somewhat heightened rational basis with a bite test.264  Prisoners 
numerically make up a significant minority within the American 
society, and we should stand up and ensure that any infringement 
on prisoners’ rights is only committed when necessary to further 
 
 259.  482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987) (listing the other three factors as: (1) 
whether there are alternative means of exercising that right; (2) the impact 
accommodation of the right will have on guards, other inmates, and the 
allocation of prison resources; and (3) absence of ready alternatives to the 
regulation). 
 260.  Id. at 87. 
 261.  See id. at 100–01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Application of [this] 
standard would seem to permit disregard for inmates’ constitutional rights 
whenever the imagination of the warden produces a plausible security 
concern and a deferential trial court is able to discern a logical connection 
between that concern and the challenged regulation.”). 
 262.   See Calvert & Murrhee, supra note 56, at 263 & n.57 (observing that 
Turner established a “very relaxed form of judicial scrutiny”). 
 263.  See Newell, supra note 153, at 71. 
 264.  See Aukerman, supra note 142, at 52–56.  
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an institution’s legitimate penological interest.265 
The legislature and prison administrators are primarily 
responsible for running prisons.266  They have had this 
responsibility since the warden of one of the first prisons 
“encouraged his guards to treat the inmates with contempt and 
flogged the insane and epileptic as well as the recalcitrant.”267  
The legislature and prison administrators had this responsibility 
when the deplorable prison conditions around the country led to 
an outbreak of prison riots.268  Clearly, the legislature and prison 
administrators have historically failed in their responsibility and 
duty to care for prisoners and protect the rights that prisoners 
retain.269 
While some infringements are necessary as a result of a 
prisoner’s status as a prisoner, other infringements violate the 
rights that prisoners retain despite their incarceration.270 
The judiciary makes prisoners, who already suffer from an 
abridgement of their constitutional rights, victims by inadequately 
reviewing their constitutional challenges to regulations or polices.  
As Justice Brennan declared, “[j]udicial intervention is 
indispensable if constitutional dictates—not to mention 
considerations of basic humanity—are to be observed in the 
prisons.”271  Without judicial intervention, prisoners will 
inevitably remain victims.  At minimum, prisoners are entitled to 
the modern “rational basis with a bite” analysis to ensure that the 
policies and regulations employed in prisons are actually 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 
The judiciary endorses many prison policies affecting 
 
 265.  See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON 1 (1997), 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/Llgsfp.pdf (“An estimated 5.1% of all persons in 
the United States will be confined in a State or Federal prison during their 
lifetime, if incarceration rates recorded in 1991 remain unchanged in the 
future.”); see also Brittany Bondurant, Note, The Privatization of Prisons and 
Prisoner Healthcare: Addressing the Extent of Prisoners’ Right to Healthcare, 
39 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT. 407, 421 (2013). 
 266.  See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 354 (1981). 
 267.  Engel & Rothman, supra note 156, at 419. 
 268.  See Miness, supra note 82, at 1706.  
 269.  See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Cooper v. Plate, 
378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964).  
 270.  See Pell, 417 U.S. at 822. 
 271.  Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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prisoners’ reading rights by giving such a high level of deference 
to prison administrators.  Further, if this deference and, 
consequently, lenient rational basis review continues, the courts 
will only be perpetuating the mistreatment, anti-inmate animus, 
and curtailment of rights that prisoners—a largely 
disenfranchised class—have long faced in this country. 
Prisoners are a weak and vulnerable segregated group within 
American society.  Still, in this country, prisoners retain all the 
rights that are not inconsistent with their role as prisoners.272  
Prisoners do retain some level of First Amendment rights.  The 
courts do not grant prisoners strict or even intermediate scrutiny 
review even when their fundamental rights are violated.  First 
Amendment rights are fundamental rights.273  The importance of 
First Amendment rights within this country is just another reason 
why prisoners need to be afforded the most stringent form of 
rational basis review available when prisoners’ First Amendment 
rights are threatened. 
CONCLUSION 
In general, the banning of certain publications within prisons 
makes sense.  Preventing prisoners from accessing publications 
that provide instructions on how to make weapons out of readily 
accessible materials or provide blueprints of the institutions in 
which they are incarcerated, is clearly necessary to further 
legitimate penological interests.  Yet, when administrators try to 
prevent prisoners from receiving Arabic/English dictionaries 
because it would be detrimental to the security of the institution if 
the prisoners learned English, the policy is no longer justified.274  
When administrators try to prevent prisoners from accessing 
books by Shakespeare, Orwell, Obama, or other new award-
 
 272.  See Pell, 417 U.S. at 822.  
 273.  See supra Section III.B (discussing why reading rights are 
fundamental and how First Amendment issues are typically treated in regard 
to free citizens). 
 274.  Jared A. Goldstein, Distinguished Research Professor of law, was 
told by the administrators of the Guantanamo Bay institution that giving his 
clients access to Arabic/English dictionaries would be detrimental to the 
security of the institution, and thus, the prisoners at the institution were 
prohibited from receiving said dictionaries.  Interview with Jared A. 
Goldstein, Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Roger Williams Univ. 
Sch. of Law, in Bristol, R.I. (May 2, 2014).   
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winning publications, it just is not rational.  The justifications 
prisons use that enable them to ban books cannot justify limitless 
restrictions.  It is important to ensure that that the penological 
interests of our institutions are narrowly tailored.  Meaning, for 
example, as a society, we should not find that a publication is 
detrimental to the institutional security of a prison simply for 
providing a critical political allegory or a controversial idea. 
The current deference awarded to the prison administrators 
and the legislature is unacceptable because it prevents one out of 
every hundred Americans from receiving the level of judicial 
review to which they are entitled.275  Prisoners are a vulnerable 
and unpopular class.  Moreover, the right argued herein is a 
fundamental right that is subject to the highest level of scrutiny 
outside of prison doors.  In order to ensure that prison policies and 
regulations are not infringing on and inhibiting prisoners’ rights, 
a more “biting rational basis review” is required.  After all, a more 
“biting” approach can be found in the Turner decision itself!276  
For this review to be meaningful, courts must use a “biting” form 
of rational basis when reviewing prisoners’ challenges to policies 
that allegedly violate their rights. 
The right to read and have open access to information is at 
the foundation of the American society.  If we are denying those 
rights to prisoners, what are we saying about our society?  We 
must bear in mind the words that Winston Churchill is reputed to 
have said: “[Y]ou measure the degree of civilization of a society by 
how it treats its weakest members.”277 
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